Annotated Bibliography Assignment, Part 3

Compile an annotated bibliography on a research question relevant to political science. The annotated bibliography should include at least have five (5) scientific sources published in an academic outlet. At least three (3) of your sources must be from approved political science publications. Such publications include those discussed during the week on literature reviews; any other sources must get approved by the professor. The annotated bibliography for this assignment can be on a different topic than the previous assignments.

The format of the annotated bibliography should begin with the research question at the top, then iterate between a citation of a source in APSA format and a summary of that source. Sources should be in alphabetical order.

Summaries of academic sources should specifically focus on the source's research question, main hypothesis, theory, research design, measurement, and results. Summaries should be given in a bullet point format that mimics the example below. The summaries should be written and edited in a professional manner.

Annotated Bibliographies will be graded on the quality of the research question, the quantity of academic sources, the formatting of the citations, and the quality of summaries, with a heavy emphasis on the quality of the summaries.

This assignment is due Thursday, April 24th before class.

Example:

What is the effect of a country's political environment on the exercise of judicial review by a country's constitutional court?

Vanberg, Georg. 2001. "Legislative-judicial relations: A game-theoretic approach to constitutional review." *American Journal of Political Science* 45(2): 346-361.

Research question: What causes constitutional courts to invalidate laws as unconstitutional?

Hypothesis: As a political environment becomes more transparent, the probability that a popular constitutional court will invalidate a statute as unconstitutional increases.

Theory: The other branches of government dislike when constitutional courts invalidate their decisions, but constitutional courts worldwide are too popular for the other branches to explicitly defy. Occasionally, however, the political environment obfuscates judicial decisions. In such instances, the other branches will avoid complying with rulings. Because constitutional courts do not have the ability to enforce their judgements without the cooperation of the legislative and executive branches of government, noncompliance risks unraveling judicial power by demonstrating the weakness of the judiciary. To avoid such a scenario, a constitutional court will only invalidate a statute if the public has the ability to observe compliance by and retribution from the other branches.

Research design: Vanberg conducts an observational study of judicial review by the German Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht). The unit of analysis is decisions by the FCC on the constitutionality of a statute between 1983 and 1995.

Measurement: The dependent variable is a dummy variable on whether the FCC ruled a statute constitutional or unconstitutional. Independent variables that measure the transparency of the political environment include a dummy variable of whether the case had oral arguments, a discrete variable on the number of briefs filed for that case, a dummy variable of whether a brief alleged that the statute was unconstitutional, and a dummy variable indicator of whether a statute's policy area is complex or not. Control variables include two dummy variables as to whether the federal government filed a brief alleging a statute was (un)constitutional.

Results: The FCC is more likely to invalidate a law when the political environment around a case is transparent. Vanberg rejects the null hypothesis of no relationship and finds evidence consistent with his hypothesis.